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Comments,
The Effect of Lender Environmental
Liability Protection Legislation
INTRODUCTION
Recently enacted legislation, namely Pennsylvania's Economic
Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liabil-
ity Protection Act' ("PA Act") and the secured creditor exemption
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 2 as amended by the Asset Con-
servation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection
Act,3("Federal Act") provides lenders with broader protection from
inadvertent environmental cleanup liability. Part I of this comment
explores the evolution of lender liability under CERCLA by exam-
ining the capacity to influence standard and the EPA Lender Liabil-
ity Rule's actual participation standard. Part II provides an analysis
of Pennsylvania's response to lender environmental liability as set
forth in the PA Act. Part III examines the Federal Act that
amended CERCLA Part IV compares Pennsylvania legislation and
federal legislation concerning lender liability protection. Finally,
Part V addresses two cases decided since the enactment of the
above mentioned legislation that illustrate the results of such en-
actments.
In 1980, with the advent of CERCLA4 and its strict liability provi-
1. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6027 (1995).
2. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6027 (1995).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 2501, 110 Stat. 3009-462 (1996).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1980) (amended 1986). CERCLA's goal is to clean up haz-
ardous waste sites with a systematic approach, and allow the Environmental Protection
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sions, lenders5 first faced potential liability for environmental
cleanup costs. Under 42 U.S.C. § 9607, the liability provisions of
CERCLA, four groups may be held liable: the current owner, the
prior owner or operator, the generator, and the transporter. If a
Agency to assess strict liability to the parties that are responsible for the contaminated
sites and make them pay for the cleanup of those sites. 2 GERALD L. BLANCHARD, LENDER
LIABLITY: LAW, PRACTICE, & PREVENTION, § 16:01, at 5 (1997).
5. Under 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(G)(iv), "lender" is defined as the following:
(I) an insured depository institution;
(II) an insured credit union;
(III) a bank or association chartered under the Farm Credit Act of 1971;
(IV) a leasing or trust company that is an affiliate of an insured depository
institution;
(V) any person (including a successor or assignee of any such person) that
makes a bona fide extension of credit to or takes or acquires a security
interest from a nonaffiliated person;
(VI) the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or any
other entity that in a bona fide manner buys or sells loans or interests in loans;
(VII) a person that insures or guarantees against a default in the repayment
of an extension of credit, or acts as a surety with respect to an extension of
credit, to a nonaffiliated person; and
(VIII) a person that provides title insurance and that acquires a vessel or
facility as a result of assignment or conveyance in the course of underwriting
claims and claims settlement.
Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal
or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by
any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances,
and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall
be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include
interest on the amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D).
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lender falls into one of these categories, it could be liable. The
prospect of liability concerned lenders because CERCLA's strict
liability provisions assess liability on entities that did not contami-
nate the property but subsequently acquired the property either by
purchase or foreclosure.7 Despite its strict liability provisions,
CERCLA, does include a secured creditor exemption, excepting
such secured creditors from the definition section of "owner or
operator"8 and, thereby, providing lenders with some protection
In the years following the enactment of CERCLA, various courts
have interpreted CERCLA's secured creditor exemption.
I. EVOLUTION OF LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
A. The Capacity to Influence Standard
In the 1990 case of United States v. Fleet Factors Corporation,°
the court held that a secured creditor may incur liability under
CERCLA "by participating in the financial management of a facility
to a degree indicating a 'capacity to influence' the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes."" In this case, Fleet Factors Cor-
poration had a security interest in the Swainsboro Print Works tex-
tile facility, including a security interest in personal property in a
Such interest shall accrue from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified
amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the expenditure concerned.
The rate of interest on the outstanding unpaid balance of the amounts
recoverable under this section shall be the same rate as is specified for interest
on investments of the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under
subchapter A of chapter 98 of Title 26. For purposes of applying such
amendments to interest under this subsection, the term "comparable maturity"
shall be determined with reference to the date on which accruing under this
subsection commences.
Id.
7. BLANCHARD, supra note 4.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) defines an "owner or operator" as follows:
(i) [I]n the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering
by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an off-
shore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the
case of any facility, title or control which was conveyed due to bank-
ruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a
unit of State or local government ... any person who owned, operated, or
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in man-
agement of a vessel or facility, holds an indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A).
10. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
11. Id. at 1157.
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deed of trust.2 Due to financial difficulties, Swainsboro Print
Works filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code." Subsequently, Fleet Factors Corporation foreclosed on its
security interest and eventually sold the textile facility and inven-
tory at an auction.'4 The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") discovered a hazardous waste problem after the foreclo-
sure, resulting in the cleanup of "700 fifty-five gallon drums con-
taining toxic chemicals" and "forty-four truckloads of material
containing asbestos."'5 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), the gov-
ernment assessed liability against Swainsboro Print Works and
Fleet Factors Corporation and brought suit to recover the cleanup
costs.'6 The Court denied Fleet Factors Corporation's motion for
summary judgment," and Fleet Factors Corporation appealed. 8
Was Fleet Factors Corporation protected from liability as a se-
cured creditor that did not participate in the management of the
facility? 9 The court left this question unanswered because mate-
rial questions of fact existed as to whether Fleet Factors Corpora-
tion's participation in the management of the facility was within
the secured creditor exemption." The case was remanded for fur-
ther determination.2' On remand, the district court rejected the
12. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955-57 (S.D. Ga. 1988). A deed of trust is "an
instrument in use in some states, taking the place and serving the uses of a mortgage, by
which the legal title to real property is placed in one or more trustees, to secure the
repayment of a sum of money or the performance of other conditions." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 414 (6th ed. 1990).
13. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. at 958. A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is "[a] proceed-
ing designed to liquidate the debtor's property, pay off his or her creditors, and dis-
charge the debtor from his or her other debts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 148 (6th ed.
1990).
14. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. at 958.
15. Id. at 959.
16. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1553. The government asserted that the Fleet
Factors Corporation was liable as the present owner under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) or as
the owner at the time of disposal under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). Id. at 1554.
17. The standard for the motion for summary judgment is "if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986).
18. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F,2d at 1553. Although the district court did not find Fleet
Factors Corporation to be liable as a present owner under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), its
motion for summary judgment was denied because there was a factual issue as to
whether Fleet Factors Corporation was liable as an owner/operator at the time of dis-
posal under 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(2). Id. at 1554.
19. Id. at 1556.
20. Id. at 1560.
21. Id.
Vol. 37:67
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government's interpretation of the secured creditor exemption as
assessing liability for "any manner" of participation in manage-
ment.2 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that if the lender has a
"capacity to influence" the management of hazardous wastes, it
will not be protected by the secured creditor exemption and will
be liable for cleanup costs.2
Fleet Factors Corp. makes it easier for the government to hold
lenders liable for CERCLA cleanup costs; if lenders have the "ca-
pacity to influence," they are participating in management. Under
this interpretation of the secured creditor exemption, lenders must
not only be conscientious about avoiding participation in the day-
to-day operations of a facility, including decision making about
environmental compliance, but must also consider whether they
have the capacity to influence such decisions.24
B. EPA Lender Liability Rule and Actual Participation
Standard
In 1992, in response to such cases as Fleet Factors Corporation,
the EPA published its Lender Liability Rule.25 The new rule sought
to overcome the narrow interpretation of the secured creditor ex-
emption under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) by providing a broader in-
terpretation. The EPA rule stated that a lender was liable only if it
actually exercised control over the management decisions relating
to environmental compliance, and incurred no liability if it only
had the capacity to influence. 6 The rule applied not only to the
original lender but also to any subsequent lenders, as well as to
guarantors.27 To be protected by the exemption, the primary pur-
pose of the lender's ownership interest must be to protect its secu-
rity interest; the lender's interest may not be for investment pur-
poses.2 The rule's significance lay in its definition of participation
in management.'
22. Id. at 1556.
23. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557. The court also noted that participation in
day to day operations, or management decisions relating to the contamination is not
required to find a lender liable. Id.
24. fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1550.
25. EPA Lender Liability Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 18382 (April 29, 1992), 40 C.F.R. §
300.1100 (1992), vacated, Kelley v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
26. BLANCHARD, supra note 4, § 16:38, at 77.
27. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a)(1) (1992), vacated, Kelley, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
28. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b).
29. Participation in management is defined as follows:
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The obvious difference between the Fleet Factors Court's inter-
pretation of the secured creditor exemption and the EPA's is that
the latter provided more protection to lenders. The EPA rule also
defined what practices are not considered participation in man-
agement: actions taken before the lender obtains a security inter-
est (such as environmental assessments and environmental com-
pliance actions); actions by the lender to protect the security inter-
est; actions by the lender prior to foreclosure to "prevent, cure, or
mitigate a default by the borrower or obligor, or [actions] to pre-
serve, or prevent the diminution of, the value of the security inter-
est;"30 and any response action under CERCLA23 In addition, the
rule provided that "as long as the borrower's management retains
the power to decline or accept the advice or counsel provided by
the lender, the lender has not reached the level of control neces-
sary to have participated in the management of the property.
32
The lender could also foreclose on a property with impunity
provided it marketed the "property in a reasonably expeditious
manner, using whatever commercially reasonable means [were]
relevant to the particular facts and circumstances."3 Although the
A holder is participating in management, while the borrower is still in
possession of the vessel or facility encumbered by the security interest,
only if the holder either: (i) Exercises decisionmaking control over the
borrower's environmental compliance, such that the holder has under-
taken responsibility for the borrower's hazardous substance handling or
disposal practices; or (ii) Exercises control at a level comparable to that
of a manager of the borrower's enterprise, such that the holder has as-
sumed or manifested responsibility for the overall management of the en-
terprise encompassing the day-to-day decisionmaking of the enterprise
with the respect to: (A) Environmental compliance; or (B) All, or substan-
tially all, of the operational (as opposed to financial or administrative) as-
pects of the enterprise other than environmental compliance. Operational
aspects of the enterprise include functions such as that of facility or plant
manager, operations manager, chief operating officer, or chief executive
officer.
Id. § 300.1100(c)(1).
30. Id. § 300.1100(c)(2)(B). These work out activities may include the following
activities:
restructuring or renegotiating the terms of the security interest; requiring pay-
ment of additional rent or interest; exercising forbearance; requiring or exer-
cising rights pursuant to an assignment of accounts or other amounts owing to
an obligor; requiring or exercising rights pursuant to an escrow agreement per-
taining to amounts owing to an obligor; providing specific or general financial
or other advice; suggestions, counseling, or guidance; and exercising any right
or remedy the holder is entitled to by law or under any warranties, covenants,
representations or promises from the borrower.
Id.
31. Id. § 300.1100(c)(2).
32. BLANCHARD, supra note 4, § 16:38, at 77.
33. Id. § 16:38, at 78.
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Lender Liability Rule seemed beneficial to lenders because it of-
fered them more protection, such protection was limited. The
Lender Liability Rule applied only to liability under CERCLA and
was not applicable to other laws; it did not address the liability of
fiduciaries and trustees, and it did not apply to actions taken prior
to its effective date.3 The method by which the EPA created the
rule was also problematic.m
C. EPA Lender Liability Rule Vacated
In 1994, the court in Kelley v. Environmental Protection
Agency 36 vacated the EPA Lender Liability Rule, holding "that EPA
lack[ed] statutory authority to restrict by regulation private rights
of action arising under the statute."37 The state of Michigan and the
Chemical Manufacturers Association in Kelley asserted that the
EPA lacked statutory authority to issue a regulation interpreting
the lender liability provisions of CERCLA because such interpreta-
tion could only come from the federal courts.3 They also argued
that the regulation was in conflict with the plain meaning of the
statute.39 The EPA argued that 42 U.S.C. § 105, dealing with the re-
sponsibility of the EPA to create the national contingency plan that
delineates the procedures to be taken for cleanup of hazardous
waste, included the authority of the EPA to define liability under
CERCLA- The court disagreed with this assertion, finding that the
EPA did not have the authority to define the liability provisions.4'
Instead, the court agreed with the state of Michigan and the
Chemical Manufacturers Association and held that, because Con-
gress included private rights of action in CERCLA, the courts, and
not the EPA, were to make the decision as to CERCLA liability.4As
a result, the court gave no deference to the EPA's interpretation of
34. Id. § 16:38, at 78.
35. Id. § 16:38, at 78-9.
36. Kelley, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
37. Id. at 1109.
38. Id. at 1104-05.
39. Id. at 1105.
40. Id. The specific provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9605 the EPA argued gave them
authority to interpret the liability section are: Section 9605(a)(3) stating that the
national contingency plan is to include: "methods and criteria for determining the
appropriate extent of removal, remedy, and other measures authorized by this chapter",
and section 9605(a)(4) stating the EPA has the authority to "appropriate roles and
responsibilities for the Federal, State, and local governments and for interstate and
nongovernmental entities in effectuating the plan." 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
41. Ketley, 15 F.3d 1105-06.
42. Id. at 1107.
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lender liability under CERCLA. Instead, courts continued to apply
the capacity to influence standard developed in Fleet Factors to
assess the liability of lenders. This resulted in lenders being left
without the protection that the EPA intended when it promulgated
the Lender Liability Rule.
II. PENNSYLVANIA'S RESPONSE TO LENDER ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABmrrY
A. Policy Reasons for the PA Act's Environmental Liability
Protection Provisions
Prior to the enactment of federal legislation in response to the
court's decision in Kelley, Pennsylvania enacted the PA Act to pro-
vide lenders with more protection from environmental liability.4
The PA Act provides lenders, along with fiduciaries and economic
development agencies ("EDAs"), protection from liability if they do
not cause the release of hazardous wastes or the contamination of
the property.44 The legislative intent is to allow economic devel-
opment agencies, fiduciaries, and lenders to assist in the redevel-
opment of property in Pennsylvania without the fear that they will
be found liable for an environmental hazard on the property.
4
The statute begins by stating the policy reasons behind the PA
Act.' The PA Act addresses EDAs 47 that exist to facilitate devel-
opment and redevelopment of property in Pennsylvania for the
benefit of all.48 If environmental liability were assessed against
these agencies when they acquire title from a defaulting tenant or
borrower or when they acquire title for financing purposes, these
agencies would be hesitant to enter into such arrangements to re-
develop property in Pennsylvania. 49 Thus, the PA Act aims to bene-
43. Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability
Protection Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6027.(1995).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 6027.2.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 6027.3. The statute defines an EDA as any agency or organization under the
Urban Redevelopment Law, the Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority Acts,
the Economic Development Financing Law, or the Capital Loan Fund Act, as well as any
municipal authority, tourist promotion agency, or local community-based nonprofit
sponsor for an industrial heritage program. Id.
48. Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability
Protection Act, § 6027.2(1).
49. Id. § 6027.2(2)-(4). The statute provides as follows:
Economic development agencies acquire title to industrial property for financ-
Vol. 37:67
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fit Pennsylvania by facilitating the growth of business and the re-
development of abandoned and reusable property.50
The statute next addresses lenders and fiduciaries. Lenders"' and
fiduciaries52 may be liable for environmental hazards even when
they are not responsible for the release and contamination."' This
potential liability makes lenders hesitant to assist in the redevel-
opment of property in Pennsylvania,' and makes fiduciaries hesi-
tant to assist persons who may have caused an environmental haz-
ard on property.5  Because of the potential deleterious effect of
environmental liability for EDAs, lenders, and fiduciaries, this PA
Act attempts to alleviate concern by protecting these entities from
ing purposes only and lease or sell the same to industrial occupants who have
sole possession of the facilities for an amount of rent or installment payments
pursuant to an installment sale contract which is determined solely on a basis
of meeting the costs of the financing and other costs associated with owner-
ship unrelated to profit.
Id. § 6027.2(2).EDAs also "acquire possession of these industrial sites from time to time
When the industrial occupant defaults under its obligations to the agencies under its
lease or installment sales agreement." Id. § 6027.2(3). Furthermore, these agencies may
"acquire industrial property either for the purpose of financing or redevelopment but
without a motive for profit or to occupy the property for their own industrial
operations." Id. § 6027.2(4).
50. Id. § 6027.2(7)-(8).
51. Id. §6027.3. A lender is defined as:
[Any person regulated or supervised by any Federal or State regulatory
agency and any of its affiliates or subsidiaries, successor or assigns,
including its officers, directors, employees, representatives or agents and
any Federal or State banking or lending agency or its successors. . . . It
also includes the initial lender and any subsequent holder of a security
interest or note, guarantor, lease financier or any successor or a receiver
or other person who acts on behalf or for the benefit of a holder of a
security interest. The terms includes an economic development agency.
Id.
52. Id. § 6027.3. A fiduciary under the Act is defined as:
[A]ny person who is considered a fiduciary under section 3(21) of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ... or who acts as trustee,
executor, administrator, custodian, guardian of estates, conservator, com-
mittee of estate of persons who are disabled, personal representative, re-
ceiver, agent, nominee, registrar of stocks and bonds, assignee or in any other
capacity for the benefit of another person.
Id.
53. Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability
Protection Act, § 6027.2(9)-(10).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 6027.2(9). Environmental liability for fiduciaries affects
family businesses [that] are unable to convey their business interests to the
next generation, and other businesses [that] are unable to receive retirement,
investment and other trust services from fiduciaries, when fiduciaries in their
personal or individual capacities may be held liable for environmental
contamination caused by other persons merely by virtue of owning property in
their trustee capacities and providing fiduciary services.
Id. § 6027.2(11).
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liability for releases or contamination they have not caused, and by
assisting in the business growth and redevelopment of property in
Pennsylvania. 
5 6
B. Protection from Environmental Liability for EDAs
EDAs will be protected from environmental liability if they "hold
an indicia of ownership in property as a security interest for the
purpose of developing or redeveloping the property or to finance
an economic development or redevelopment activity."57 This pro-
tection, however, is based on certain conditions. The EDAs will
not be liable unless they "directly cause[] an immediate release or
directly exacerbate[] a release of a regulated substance on or from
the property."8 There is no liability if the agency forecloses on
property or if it conducts a remedial action.5 9
C. Protection of Lenders from Environmental Liability
Under section 6027.5, a lender is protected from environmental
liability if it mainly provides standard commercial lending services,
such as financial services, retention of security interests, and fore-
closures.6° A lender is protected unless "its employees or agents
directly cause an immediate release or directly exacerbate a re-
lease of a regulated substances on or from the property."6' A lender
will be liable if it "knowingly compelled the borrower" to either
release a substance or violate any environmental law.62 If the
lender's activity caused a release or if the lender compelled a bor-
56. Id. § 6027.2(12).
57. Id. § 6027.4. An indicia of ownership is defined as follows:
Any legal or equitable interest in property acquired directly or indirectly:
(1) for securing payment of a loan or indebtedness, a right of reimbursement
or subrogation under a guaranty or the performance of another obligation;
(2) evidencing ownership under a lease financing transaction where the
lessor does not initially select or ordinarily control the daily operation or
maintenance of the property; or
(3) in the course of creating, protecting or enforcing a security interest or
right of reimbursement of subrogation under a guaranty.
Id. § 6027.3.
58. Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability
Protection Act, § 6027.4(1).
59. Id. § 6027.4(2)-(3). EDAs will cooperate with the EPA regarding the remedial
actions and will either perform them or not hinder the performance of them by others.
Id. § 6027.4(4).
60. Id. § 6027.5(a).
61. Id. § 6027.5(a)(1).
62. Id. § 6027.5(a)(2).
Vol. 37:67
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rower to cause a release, then the lender's liability will be limited
to the cost of the response action.- Lenders are not liable when
they foreclose on property and subsequently own or control it.'
Lenders will not be responsible for response action costs for re-
leases that occur before and continue after foreclosure, but they
will be responsible if they act to directly exacerbate releases for
estate claims.6
D. Protection of Fiduciaries from Environmental Liability
Under section 6027.6, fiduciaries are not personally liable for
environmentally contaminated property, unless a release occurs
while they have an "express power and authority to control the
property," and the release is a result of "gross negligence or willful
misconduct." Any liability of a fiduciary is limited to the cost of a
response action that is necessitated by the fiduciary's activities.67 If
the fiduciary is a lessor of property, it is the lessee who has control
of the property pursuant to section 6027.6(a)(2).6 The fiduciary
will not be responsible for the cost of response actions if the re-
lease occurs prior to and continues after any fiduciary activities.69
63. Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability
Protection Act, § 6027.5(b). The lender will be liable only if its activities were the
"proximate and efficient cause of the release or violation." Id. A response action is
defined in § 6027.3 as follows:
An action, including, but not limited to, a response or interim response,
remedial response or remedy or corrective action, closure or any other ac-
tion under the environmental acts in response to a release, such as test-
ing, inspections, sampling, installations, corrective action, removals, clo-
sure, response costs, assessments or any types of claims, damages, ac-
tions, fines and penalties.
Id. § 6027.3.
64. Id. § 6027.5(b).Foreclosure is defined as follows:
The date upon which title vests in property through realizing upon a security
interest, including but not limited to, any ownership of property recognized
under applicable law as vesting the holder of the security interest with some
indicia of title, legal or equitable title obtained at or in lieu of foreclosure,
sheriff sales, bankruptcy distributions and their equivalents.
Id. § 6027.3.
65. Id. § 6027.5(b). If a release is discovered during the environmental due diligence
period it "shall be presumed to be a prior or continuing release on the property." Id.
Environmental due diligence is defined as "[ilnvestigative techniques, including but not
limited to, visual property inspections, electronic environmental data base searches,
review of ownership and use history of the property, environmental questionnaires,
transaction screens, environmental assessments or audits." Id. § 6027.3.
66. Id. § 6027.6(a).
67. Id. § 6027.6(b).
68. Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability
Protection Act, § 6027.6(b).
69. Id. A fiduciary will be liable for a response action that is a result of the fiduciary's
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Although fiduciaries are protected in their personal capacities,
they are not protected in their representative capacity.
70
E. Other Provisions
Although the PA Act provides increased protection for EDAs,
lenders, and fiduciaries, they can still be held liable. Under section
6027.7, any one of these entities can avoid liability if a release is
caused by events that are beyond the entity's control.71 A party can
also avoid liability if it can prove any defense applicable to other
environmental laws72 or the common law.73
Section 6027.8 is a savings provision that provides that no pri-
vate right of action is created by the PA Act.74 It also provides that
this PA Act does not affect the rights and defenses available to
EDAs, lenders, and fiduciaries under other applicable law.
If found liable, EDAs, lenders, and fiduciaries will be liable only
for that part of the liability that resulted from their particular ac-
tivities.78 Section 6027.10 also provides that "this act preempts and
exacerbation of a release. Id.
70. Id. § 6027.6. Representative capacity means "the office or other position an agent
holds in relation to his or her principal which, along with the principal's name, should be
indicated on any instrument the agent signs for the principal so that the agent herself
avoids personal liability." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 1302 (6th ed. 1990).
71. Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability
Protection Act, § 6027.7. Entities can avoid liability under § 6027.7 if one of the following
occurs:
(1) An act of God.
(2) An intervening act of a public agency.
(3) Migration from property owned by a third party.
(4) Actions taken or omitted in the course of rendering care, assistance or
advice in accordance with the environmental acts or at the direction of the
department.
(5) An act of a third party who was not an agent or employee of the lender,
fiduciary or economic development agency.
(6) If the alleged liability .. .arises after foreclosure and the lender or
economic development agency exercised due care .. . and took reasonable
precautions.
Id.
72. Id. § 6027.3. Environmental acts include the Clean Streams Law, the Air Pollution
Control Act, the Solid Waste Management Act, the Worker and Community Right to
Know Act, the Infectious and Chemotherapeutic Waste Law, the Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act, the Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act, the Hazardous Material
Emergency Planning and Response Act, the Oil Spill Responder Liability Act, and any
other federal, state, or local environmental law. Id.
73. Id. § 6027.7.
74. Id. § 6027.8.
75. Id.
76. Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender Environmental Liability
Protection Act, § 6027.9.
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eliminates all present liability standards" including the secured
creditor exemption. The PA Act also preempts and repeals any
environmental law that is inconsistent relative to liability.78 Fur-
thermore, section 6027.13 provides that the PA Act also applies
retroactively.79 Thus, the PA Act provides EDAs, lenders, and fidu-
ciaries with increased protection from environmental liability.
I1. FEDERAL LENDER LIABILITY PROTECTION LEGISLATION
A. Secured Creditor Exemption and Validation of EPA Lender
Liability Rule
In response to Kelley, Congress enacted federal lender liability
legislation in the form of the Federal Act.8° This legislation in-
cluded an amendment to CERCLA's lender and fiduciary liability
limitations.81 The legislation amends the definition of owner or op-
erator by limiting what constitutes participation in management.'
As long as the lender does not participate in the management of
the facility or control the activities at the facility, the lender will
not be liable.83
CERCLA defines owner or operator so as to specifically exclude
a lender that holds an ownership interest in a facility solely to pro-
tect its security interest as long as it does not participate in man-
agement.8 Furthermore, under CERCLA, foreclosure on a facility
will not make the lender liable provided it did not participate in the
management of the facility prior to the foreclosure action.8 5 The
term participation in management "does not include merely having
the capacity to influence, or the unexercised right to control vessel
77. Id. § 6027.10.
78. Id. § 6027.12.
79. Id. § 6027.13.
80. Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No.104-208 § 2501, 110 Stat. 3009-462 (1996).
81. Id. § 2502.
82. Id. § 2502(b)(E).
83. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(ii). A lender may foreclose on a facility without liability
even if, as a result of the foreclosure, the lender "sells, releases (in the case of a lease
finance transaction), or liquidates the vessel or facility, maintains business activities,
winds up operations, undertakes a response action.., or takes any other measure to
preserve, protect, or prepare the vessel or facility prior to sale or disposition...." Id. §
9601(20)(E)(ii).
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or facility operations.", 6 A lender that takes an ownership interest
merely to protect its security interest will nonetheless be deemed
to participate in management if it makes decisions regarding envi-
ronmental compliance and assumes responsibility for disposal
procedures or if it manages and influences routine decision-
making related to environmental compliance or operational mat-
ters.87 If a lender does not participate in the management as de-
scribed above but merely holds the vessel or facility as security,
then the lender will not be liable under CERCLA.
In addition, the 1996 amendment to CERCLA addresses the 1992
EPA Lender Liability Rule that was invalidated by KeUey8' in 1994.
The 1992 EPA Lender Liability Rule was validated as within the
authority of the EPA to promulgate with the enactment of the Fed-
eral Act.8 The amendment also stated that this final rule shall not
be reviewed by any court.9° As a result of the amendment, partici-
pation in management requires the actual exercise of control and
not the mere capacity to influence, as interpreted in the Fleet Fac-
tors Corporation9 and Kelley"2 cases.
86. Id. § 9601(20)(F).
87. Id. Participation in management does not include:
(I) holding a security interest or abandoning or releasing a security interest;
(II) including in the terms of an extension of credit, or in a contract or security
agreement relating to the extension, a covenant, warranty, or other term or condition
that relates to environmental compliance;
(HI) monitoring or enforcing the terms and conditions of the extension of credit
or security interest;
(IV) monitoring or undertaking 1 or more inspections of the vessel or facility;
(V) requiring a response action or other lawful means of addressing the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance in connection with the vessel or facility
prior to, during, or on the expiration of the term of the extension of credit;
(VI) providing financial or other advice or counseling in an effort to mitigate,
prevent, or cure default or diminution in the value of the vessel or facility;
(VII) restructuring, renegotiating, or otherwise agreeing to alter the terms and
conditions of the extension of credit or security interest, exercising forbearance;
(VIII) exercising other remedies that may be available under applicable law for
the breach of a term or condition of the extension of credit or security agreement; or
(IX) conducting a response action under section 9607(d) of this title or under the
direction of an on-scene coordinator appointed under the National Contingency Plan, if
the actions do not rise to the level of participating in management.
Id. § 9601(20)(F)(iv).
88. Kelley v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
89. Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2504(a). 110 Stat. 3009-468 (1996).
90. Id. § 2504(b).
91. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1lth Cir. 1990).
92. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1100.
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B. Fiduciary Liability Protection
The final important amendment to CERCLA made by the Fed-
eral Act is the specific reference to fiduciary liability. 3 The refer-
ence is significant because CERCLA had not previously distin-
guished between fiduciaries as owners of property and other
property owners. Both could be held liable under the unamended
version of CERCLA as owners. Section 9607(n) provides that the
liability of fiduciaries "shall not exceed the assets held in the fidu-
ciary capacity."9 This limitation on liability, however, is inapplica-
ble to an individual person's liability for actions taken independent
of the fiduciary capacity or if a release occurs because of the neg-
ligence of the fiduciary.
95
The safe harbor for fiduciaries is that they are not personally
liable for the response actions, nor for (1) terminating the fiduciary
relationship, (2) adding environmental compliance in the fiduciary
agreement, (3) monitoring and inspections, (4) giving financial ad-
vice, (5) altering the fiduciary relationship, (6) managing a con-
taminated vessel or facility prior to the origination of the fiduciary
relationship, or (7) declining to take any of the above listed ac-
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n)(5)(A) (1996). The term fiduciary is defined as follows:





(V) guardian of estate or guardian ad litem;
(VI) receiver;
(VII) conservator;
(VIII) committee of estates of incapacitated persons;
(IX) personal representative;
(X) trustee (including a successor to a trustee) under an indenture
agreement, trust agreement, lease, or similar financing agreement, for debt
securities, certificates of interest or certificates of participation in debt
securities, or other forms of indebtedness as to which the trustee is not, in the
capacity of trustee, the lender, or
(XI) representative in any other capacity that the Administrator, after
providing public notice, determines to be similar to the capacities described
in subclauses (I) through (X); and
(ii) does not include-
(I) a person that is acting as a fiduciary with respect to a trust or other
fiduciary estate that was organized for the primary purpose of, or is engaged
in, actively carrying on a trade or business for profit, unless the trust or other
fiduciary estate was created as part of, or to facilitate, 1 or more estate plans
or because of the incapacity of a natural person; or
(II) a person that acquires ownership or control of a vessel or facility with
the objective purpose of avoiding liability of the person or of any other person.
Id.
94. Id. § 9607(n)(1).
95. Id. § 9607(n)(2)-(3).
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tions.96The amendment neither affects rights under or defenses to
other applicable laws nor creates a private right of action against a
fiduciary.9 7 Only fiduciaries in their fiduciary capacity may be pro-
tected from environmental liability. If the fiduciary acts as a bene-
ficiary of a trust or if the fiduciary is a beneficiary as to the same
estate and in its fiduciary capacity receives benefits beyond what
is normally received, then it may be subject to liability.98
IV. COMPARISON OF FEDERAL ACT AND PA ACT
The Federal Acte provides greater protection against environ-
mental liability for lenders and fiduciaries, provided that such enti-
ties do not actually participate in the management of the property,
than does CERCLA The PA Act'00 also offers broader protection
from environmental liability for lenders, fiduciaries and EDAs in
order to promote the redevelopment of property and provide for
business growth in Pennsylvania.
Both acts are similar in that they offer protection to lenders and
fiduciaries. The PA Act offers protection by excluding liability for a
lender that does not cause a release or exacerbate a release of
regulated substances. '0 The Federal Act precludes liability pro-
vided the lender does not actually participate in the management
of the property."
Both acts impose liability when a lender oversteps the bounds of
what are considered routine practices of commercial lending, but
the PA Act offers broader protection by assessing liability only
when a lender causes or exacerbates a release and does not re-
quire an analysis of whether the lender participated in manage-
ment. Both acts also shield a lender from liability when it fore-
closes on property to protect its security interest. In this situation,
the lender is an owner only as a result of a borrower's default and
should not be responsible for hazardous materials or environ-
mental contaminants on the property.
In addition, the PA Act focuses on EDAs because its aim is to
96. Id. § 9607(n)(4).
97. Id. § 9607(n)(6).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n)(7).
99. Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No.104-208 § 2501, 110 Stat.3009-462 (1996).
100. Pennsylvania Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender
Environmental Liability Protection Act of 1995, 35 PA CONS. STAT. § 6027 (1998).
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a).
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foster economic development through the redevelopment and re-
use of property. The PA Act is also more inclusive than is the Fed-
eral Act, because it targets EDAs as well as lenders and fiduciaries
who are concerned with inadvertent environmental liability. 13
Similarly, both acts address fiduciary liability and protect the
fiduciaries in their personal capacities but not in their representa-
tive capacities. The PA Act focuses on liability when a fiduciary (1)
has control over the property, which assumes that the fiduciary
should be able to prevent any releases, or (2) is negligent. If found
liable, the fiduciary will only be responsible for its share of the ad-
ditional cost of the response action.
The Federal Act assesses liability to a fiduciary for negligent ac-
tions, as well as actions taken that are distinct from its fiduciary
capacity. If a court finds a fiduciary liable under the Federal Act,
liability is limited to the assets held in the fiduciary capacity. Con-
sequently, the Federal Act protects fiduciaries from environmental
liability provided they act within their fiduciary capacity.'°4
The PA Act illustrates the important connection between lenders
and property development and transfer. The PA Act and the Fed-
eral Act have been passed in large part because of the significance
of this connection. Their purpose is to protect lenders, fiduciaries,
as well as EDAs for the PA Act, from liability for environmentally
contaminated property when such contamination results from the
actions of others.
In Pennsylvania, as a result of the PA Act, lenders are provided
with broader protection than they were before the enactment of
the PA Act. Since the PA Act was passed in 1995 to address lender
environmental liability protection, few cases have dealt with the
statute.
V. OUTCOME OF LENDER ENVIRONMENTAL LABLIrY
PROTECTION
A recent Pennsylvania case, Raab v. Westinghouse Electric and
Mellon Bank,10 5 illustrates the determination of liability under the
PA Act. In Raab, the court held that retroactive application of the
PA Act protected a trustee-fiduciary from environmental liability
103. Pennsylvania Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary and Lender
Environmental Liability Protection Act of 1995, § 6027.2(13).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n)(5)(B).
105. Raab v. Westinghouse Electric and Mellon Bank, No. 1378 (Phila. Co. C.P., Nov.
17, 1997).
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under the Pennsylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act. 6
On April 19, 1979, Max L. Raab purchased the property in ques-
tion from Mellon Bank and Trust Company ("Mellon"), which was
acting as a trustee for Westinghouse Pension Plan Trust ("West-
inghouse"). 117 Prior to Raab's ownership, Mellon held the property
and leased it to Westinghouse.' In 1965, Mellon acquired an adja-
cent piece of property from Daromann, Inc.1°9 Subsequently, Mel-
lon leased that adjacent property back to Daromann, Inc. to use as
a heating fuel yard until June 1, 1970.1 From 1968 until 1978,
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York owned the prop-
erty as the new trustee for Westinghouse."' From early 1978
through April 19, 1978, Mellon held title to the property solely as
trustee for Westinghouse and never exercised control over the
property, except for executing the lease to Westinghouse.1
2
Prior to closing, Raab conducted approximately six inspections
of the property, and became aware of the fuel intake pipes, fuel
pump, and gasoline pump on the property."" Raab signed an
Agreement of Sale in which he accepted the property in an "as-is"
condition without warranty."4 He was not aware of any under-
ground storage tank problems at the time."' During the time the
property was for sale, Mellon neither played a role in its marketing
nor dealt directly with Raab. 116 Raab dealt strictly with a broker
and never spoke with anyone at Mellon."7
In 1992, some thirteen years after Raab's acquisition of the prop-
erty in 1979, an environmental study undertaken to determine
whether there were any hazardous wastes on the property re-
vealed the existence of the underground storage tanks. The five
underground storage tanks that were located on property were
removed in 1994.2" Raab was listed as the owner of the property
on an Underground Storage Tank Closure Report Form to the
106. Raab, No.1378 at 11(19).
107. Id. at I(1),(25).
108. Id. at 1(2).
109. Id. at I(3),(5), (10).
110. Id. at I(3),(5), (10).
111. Raab, No. 1378 at 1(13), (18).
112. Id. at 1(20), (24).
113. Id. at I (26),(41).
114. Id. at 1(36).
115. Id. at 1(51).
116. Raab, No.1378 at 1(31), (33).
117. Id. at I(32)-(33).
118. Id. at I(53)-(54).
119. Id. at I(68)-(69).
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Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. 
1 20
The corroded tanks contained a combination of "diesel fuel, wa-
ter and sludge."12' The type of diesel fuel found in the tanks was a
"regulated substance under the Storage Tanks and Spill Prevention
Act."122 Because of the corrosion, the excavation of the tanks
caused fuel contamination of the soil. 123 There was also contarnina-
tion from the underground storage tanks themselves. 24 The re-
moval of the corroded tanks resulted in six thousand tons of soil
being removed and treated and the concrete pad that covered the
location of the tanks being removed over a three- to four-month
period at a cost to Raab of $572,624.77. 125
Raab filed suit against Mellon in order to recoup some of the
cleanup costs. 26 The court found that Mellon and Westinghouse
were not liable for the contamination under the Storage Tank and
Spill Prevention Act, which had been enacted in 1989, because
they were neither owners nor operators of the underground stor-
age tanks as defined by this act.127 Mellon had acted as a fiduciary
for Westinghouse in all its actions pertaining to the property and,
therefore, was not liable in its personal or individual capacity for
the environmental contamination of the property. 28 Pursuant to
the PA Act, if a fiduciary leases property, it is the lessee, and not
the fiduciary, that is deemed to control the property.'29 Thus, the
court found that Raab failed to prove the following: (1) that Mel-
lon's activities caused the contamination to the property; (2) that
Mellon caused a release of a substance regulated under the Stor-
age Tank and Spill Prevention Act; (3) that Mellon controlled the
property at the time of the release; and (4) that Mellon had been
grossly negligent when the release occurred.'
30
Although the Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act was enacted
in 1989 and the PA Act was not enacted until 1995, the court held
that the latter applied retroactively to protect Mellon, as a fiduci-
ary, in its individual or personal capacity from environmental li-
120. Id. at I(70)-(71).
121. Raab, No. 1378 at 1(81).
122. Id. at 1(82).
123. Id. at 1(85).
124. Id. at 1(89).
125. Id. at 1(91), (92), (101).
126. Raab, No.1378 at II.
127. Id. at II(2),(3),(5),(8).
128. Id. at II(13)-(14).
129. Id. at 11(15).
130. Id. at II(16)-(17).
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ability under the former.'3 With the fiduciary protected from envi-
ronmental liability, the court found Raab, as the owner, to be liable
for all cleanup costs. 2
In Raab, the PA Act protected the fiduciary from liability be-
cause it neither caused the contamination of the property nor was
negligent in its fiduciary capacity. The Raab case is the first case
that has interpreted the PA Act. It leads to the assumption that
lenders, as well as fiduciaries and EDAs, are protected from envi-
ronmental liability if they do not cause a release or facilitate an
environmental hazard. Because the fiduciary was not liable for
cleanup costs, the Raab Court found that it is the current owner
who will bear all the cleanup costs. In other cases, it may be the
prior owner, the generator, or transporter who will bear the costs.
For the present time, lenders, fiduciaries, and EDAs, have the com-
fort of knowing that they are protected by the PA Act.
Similar results have been reached under the Federal Act. In
Kelley v. Tiscornia,'33 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision holding that Manufacturers
National Bank of Detroit ("Bank") was not an owner/operator of
the facility that it foreclosed upon and, therefore, was not respon-
sible for cleanup costs."" Here, the State of Michigan filed suit un-
der CERCLA and sought to recover cleanup costs for two factory
sites no longer operated by Automobile Specialties Manufacturing
Company.'M The Bank was also named as a defendant.136 However,
the district court granted summary judgment to the Bank because
the Bank was held to be within the secured creditor exemption of
CERCLA137
The district court interpreted the secured creditor exemption
based on the EPA lender liability rule that defined participation in
management.M Although the EPA lender liability rule was later
vacated, the Federal Act amended CERCLA and codified the EPA
lender liability rule after the district court's ruling and before the
appeals court heard the case.39 Because the "amendments are ex-
131. Raab, No. 1378 at 11(19).
132. Id. at 11(21).
133. No. 94-1403, 1996 WL 732323 (6th Cir. Dec.19, 1996).





139. Kelley, No. 94-1403, 1996 WL 732323, at *2.
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pressly made applicable to any claim 'that has not been finally ad-
judicated as of the date of enactment,"' the rule applied in this
case. 140
The pertinent issue in the case was whether the Bank partici-
pated in the management of the factory sites.141 The district court
found that no facts supported such a finding and that the State did
not allege that the Bank participated in ultimate decision-maling
or daily management responsibility about environmental concerns
at the factories.' 42 Nor did the evidence show that the Bank partici-
pated in daily management of all operations of the factories "other
than environmental compliance as opposed to financial or admin-
istrative aspects of the company's business." "
The court held that the Bank did not participate in management
as defined in CERCLA amendment.'44 Rather, the Bank participated
solely in a financial or administrative capacity. '45 Thus the lender
was not held liable for cleanup costs
CONCLUSION
The PA Act and the secured creditor exemption under CERCLA
as amended by the Federal Act provide lenders with broader pro-
tection from inadvertent environmental cleanup liability. The PA
Act fosters property redevelopment in Pennsylvania and new
business growth. The benefits of the PA Act and the Federal Act lie
not only in protecting lenders, but also in placing the responsibility
and liability for the cleanup of environmental contamination upon
the responsible parties who caused or facilitated the releases of
environmentally hazardous substances. These new laws discour-
age lenders from directly causing or exacerbating a release and
from participating in the management of the properties in which
they hold security interests, while shielding them from cleanup
liability for environmental contamination for which they are not
responsible. The choice is with the lenders. The lenders can either
enjoy the extra protection of these new laws by neither directly
causing or exacerbating a release nor participating in the man-





144. Kelley, No. 94-1403, 1996 WL 732323, at *2.
145 Id.
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they can choose to directly cause or exacerbate a release or to par-
ticipate in the management of such properties and open them-
selves up to environmental cleanup liability.
Dawn A. Baumholtz
